Jesuits as Peacemakers: Negotiating with Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Sitting Bull by Donnelly, John
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
History Faculty Research and Publications History, Department of
1-1-2008
Jesuits as Peacemakers: Negotiating with Ivan the
Terrible, Peter the Great and Sitting Bull
John Donnelly
Marquette University, john.p.donnelly@marquette.edu
Published version. "The Jesuits as Peacemakers: Negotiating with Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great
and Sitting Bull" by John Patrick Donnelly, SJ, from Justice and Mercy Will Kiss. Paths to Peace in a
World of Many Faiths. Edited by Michael K. Duffey and Deborah S. Nash. ISBN 9780874627350
ISBN 0874627354. Publisher Link. © 2008 Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press.
Reprinted with permission.
I I. THE JESUITS AS PEACE MAKERS! 
NEGOTIATING WITH IVAN THE TERRIBLE, 
PETER THE GREAT AND SITTING BULL! 
JOHN PATRICK DONNELLY, S.J. 
L et us begin with two quotations. "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God" [Mt 5:9]. Less familiar is the statement of the Jesuit Constitutions that Jesuits are "to 
travel through the world and live in any part of it whatsoever where 
there is hope of greater service to God and of the help of souls:'2 The 
still earlier Formula, or first draft of the Constitutions, urged the Jesuits 
to be peacemakers and reconcilers for different factions within society. 3 
This paper will look at three case studies of Jesuits as peacemakers. I 
confess that I have chosen these three cases because of their exotic 
locations and personalities no less than their importance. 
ANTONIO POSSEVINO AND IVAN THE TERRIBLE4 
Our first case study began on February 24, 1581, when a Russian en, 
voy, !stoma Sevrigin, arrived unexpectedly at Rome. Papal, Russian 
contacts had been rare but not unprecedented. Ivan the Terrible sent 
Sevrigin because he was losing the Livonian War against Poland, 
which Ivan had started in 1563 by taking over much of Livonia-
mostly today's Latvia and Estonia-from Poland. But then things 
1 A longer version of this paper was presented at Fordham University, in 
March of1995. 
2 Jesuit Constitutions, #304. 
3 Formula, #3. 
4 The main sources for this part are Antonio Possevino, The Moscovia, 
translated and introduced by Hugh Graham (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Center for International Studies, 1977); A. M. Amann, edi, 
tor, "Joannis Pauli Campani S.I. relatio de itinere Moscovitica" Antemurale 
VI (1960,61), 1,85; Stanislas Polcin, Une tentative d'Union au XVIe siecle: 
La mission religieuse du pere Antoine Possevin SJ. en Moscovie (1581-1582) 
(Rome: lstituto orientale, 1957); Norman Davies, God's Playground: A 
History of Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). 
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went sour. In 1571 the Crimean Tartars sacked Moscow. In 1578 the 
Swedes defeated Ivan's army. Still worse, in 1575 the Poles elected a 
new king, Stephan Bathory, a dedicated Catholic famous for skilled 
generalship. In his coronation oath Bathory promised to recover the 
lands that Ivan had invaded. He made good his promise. The war eli~ 
maxed in 1581 when a Polish army of one hundred seventy thousand 
men besieged fifty~seven thousand Russians in Pskov, which lies some 
three hundred thirty miles south, southwest of modern St. Petersburg. 
The siege lasted six months until the Peace Treaty of Jam Zapolski 
was signed and the war ended, largely through the efforts of the Jesuit 
Antonio Possevino. 5 
In 1581, Ivan needed peace and tried to enlist Pope Gregory XIII's 
help by making vague promises to enter a Holy League against the 
Turks. Gregory had long dreamed of uniting Emperor Rudolf II, Yen~ 
ice, Bathory and Ivan against the still dangerous Ottomans. He also 
hoped that the Catholic faith might penetrate Ivan's Iron Curtain. It 
was a forlorn hope. As the Cardinal Secretary of State observed, Ivan's 
letter asking for papal intervention contained not a hint of religious 
concessions. Gregory chose as papal legate Antonio Possevino. He 
was to accompany Sevrigin back to Moscow and was charged with 
fostering religious reunion between Moscovia and Rome by mediating 
peace between Bathory and the Czar. He was also to seek the Czar's 
permission to build a few Catholic churches for the Catholic mer~ 
chants trading in Moscovia. 
On his way north, Possevino tried to enlist the support of Venice 
and of Emperor Rudolf in Prague. He then conferred several times 
with Bathory before heading toward Mosco via. 6 Meanwhile Possevino 
was studying books on Moscovia and Russian Orthodoxy and search~ 
ing the Greek Church Fathers for arguments to blunt Russian charges 
against Catholicism.7 On the final leg of his trip to Moscovia, Possevi~ 
no was accompanied by four other Jesuits. On August 20, Ivan greeted 
Possevino and his companions at Staritsa on the Volga with elaborate 
ceremonies, but he kept the Jesuits under virtual house arrest, treating 
them like spies. 8 Possevino tried to open the religious question with 
Ivan, but the Czar only made a vague promise to discuss this after 
5 Davies, 4 26~ 31. 
6 Polein. 4, 9. 
7 Ibid. 5,7. 
8 Ibid,l3~14. 
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peace with the Poles was concluded. Ivan did promise to allow Latin 
Masses for Catholic merchants in private homes, but no Muscovite 
could attend these services. 9 
Meanwhile the siege of Pskov continued; sickness and a spirited 
Russian defense were taking a toll on the huge Polish army. Ivan wrote 
Bathory a long letter dated June 29 which offered terms which he 
claimed were advantageous, but the letter called Bathory a liar, thirsty 
for Christian blood, and ended with an ultimatum: if Bathory did not 
accept his terms Ivan would drop all diplomatic relations between 
Poland and Muscovy. Bathory's answer, which reached Ivan on Au~ 
gust 2 identified Ivan with Cain, Pharaoh, Nero, Herod and even Sa~ 
tan. Bathory proposed that the two monarchs fight a duel: that would 
decide their war and spare Christian blood. If Ivan refused to duel, 
he deserved to be called a woman and not a man.10 In sixteenth cen~ 
tury diplomacy, royal egos were often more important than political 
or economic considerations. Both Ivan and Bathory had giant egos. 
Possevino, the peacemaker, had his work cut out for him. 
When Ivan and Possevino met again on September 12, the Czar 
officially charged him with negotiating a treaty with Bathory. The fi~ 
nal treaty should include a ten~year armistice. Possevino was then to 
return to the Czar, who had kept two of his Jesuit companions as hos~ 
tages. Possevino sent the third Jesuit to Rome with dispatches.11 
After five meetings with Ivan at Staritsa, 12 Possevino returned to 
the Polish camp. There in October he discussed Ivan's proposals with 
Bathory and Jan Zamoiski, the Polish Grand Chancellor. The Pol~ 
ish leaders decided to continue the siege of Pskov to keep pressure 
on Ivan, but they agreed to negotiate. Possevino informed Ivan of 
this, and I van sent delegates to meet Polish representatives near Jam 
Zapolski, neutral territory dose to Pskov. The deliberations lasted 
from December 13, 1581 to January 15, 1582. Both also used various 
ploys to strengthen their bargaining position. Both sides threatened 
to leave the conference. Another ploy was to introduce irrelevant is~ 
sues, then try to trade them for points on the major issues.13 Several 
9 Ibid,16. 
10 Ibid. 10,11, 16,17. 
11 Ibid., 17,22. 
12 Ibid, 14,17. 
13 Possevino, xxiii,xxv-Graham's Introduction. 
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times Possevino adroitly intervened to prevent breakdowns. Even on 
the last day, negotiations were so fragile that the Poles threatened to 
walk out.14 Possevino's book Moscovia gives a detailed account of the 
twenty~one sessions of negotiations.15 News from the siege, now Rus~ 
sian successes, now Polish, affected the bargaining. 
Was Possevino an honest broker, was he impartial~ Yes and no. He 
despised Ivan as a cruel tyrant and admired Bathory.16 Still, Possevino 
had strong reasons to help Ivan's representatives. They wanted peace 
because their country was prostrate; he wanted peace both on prin~ 
ciple and because without a favorable peace, there was no hope of an 
anti~Turkish alliance, no hope of fostering religious union with the 
Russian church or even of establishing a tiny foothold for Catholic 
worship. At one point Possevino offered to forfeit his own life to Ivan 
rather than see the negotiations faiL 17 In the end, the Russians got 
the best of the bargaining. Soon after the Peace of Jam Zapolski was 
signed on January 15, 1582, the Poles lifted the siege of Pskov and re~ 
treated to the borders the treaty assigned them. Ivan gave up nothing 
that his armies had not already lost.18 
After the treaty, Possevino went to Moscow to discuss religious 
issues with Ivan. Now that he had peace, Ivan was willing to yield 
nothing-indeed he became so angry while debating theology with 
Possevino that he raised his iron~tipped staff to bash in the Jesuit's 
brains.19 
THE TREATY OF NERCHINSK, 1689 
The month of August 1689 was a landmark in Russian history for two 
reasons. In Moscow Peter the Great's supporters overthrew the Regent 
Sophia and made young Peter the Great effective ruler. On August 
27 [old style] thousands of miles to the east at Nerchinsk, Russian 
and Chinese diplomats concluded a treaty which determined a bor~ 
der between Russia and China which, with minor adjustments, lasted 
for nearly one hundred seventy years. By the Treaty ofNerchinsk the 
14 Ibid, 139. 
15 Ibid, 106~ 39. 
16 Ibid, xiv, xix, xxiv-Graham's Introduction. 
17 Ibid, 123, 125. 
18 Ibid, XXV. 
19 Ibid, 72. 
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Russians ceded to the Chinese land almost equivalent to Germany 
and France combined. 
Nerchinsk was the first treaty made by China with a European pow, 
er and the first to be worked out according to European patterns of 
diplomacy. Earlier the Chinese had viewed foreign countries, whether 
Asian or European, not as sovereign equals but as mere tributaries. 
Ivan the Terrible had encouraged Russian expansion eastward, and 
Cossack pioneers had begun to explore and conquer the vast reaches 
of Siberia. This brought the Russians up against lands that the Chi, 
nese had long regarded as their own. Although local peoples had ac, 
cepted a vague Chinese suzerainty as far back as the fifteenth century, 
the Chinese had never effectively ruled the region. Gradually Russian 
traders moved south to the Amur River, the Russian,Chinese border 
today. Russian soldiers built forts, notably at Albazin. 
In 1680, the great Chinese Emperor Kang Xi was determined to 
stop these encroachments and sent troops to build forts in the disput, 
ed territory. He consolidated the new Manchu dynasty which ruled 
China until the early twentieth century. In 1685 he sent a large Chi, 
nese army to assault Albazin, the most forward Russian outpost. The 
Russians surrendered and retreated north to Nerchinsk. The Chinese 
army destroyed the fort and returned home. The next year the Rus, 
sians returned and rebuilt their fort at Albazin. Kang Xi ordered his 
army to retake it. The second siege lasted thirteen months. The Rus, 
sians started with eight hundred twenty,six men; less than seventy 
were still alive when the Chinese lifted the siege after Peter decided to 
negotiate the border between the world's two largest countries. 20 
20 The most important source for this section on the treaty ofNerchinsk 
is Joseph Sebes, The jesuits and the Sino,Russian Treaty ofNerchinsk (1689) 
(Rome: IHSI, 1961), 67,70. I have also usedJohnJ. Stephan, The Russian 
Far East: A History (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1994), 26,49, 
278; Yuri Semyonov, Siberia: Its Conquest and Development (Montreal: In, 
temational Publishers, 1963), translated by J.R. Foster, 113,23, 274,75; 
George V. Lantzeff and Richard A. Pierce, Eastward to Empire: Explora, 
tion and Conquest on the Russian Open Frontier to 1750 (Montreal McGill, 
Queen's University Press, 1973), 178,82, and Benson Bobrick, East of the 
Sun: The Epic Conquest and Tragic History of Siberia (NY: Poseidon Press, 
1992), 88,90. The text of the treaty is printed in Russia's Conquest ofSibe, 
ria: 1558,1700 (N.P.: Western Imprints, Oregon Historical Society, 1985) 
edited by Basil Dmytryshyn et al., Vol. I, #133. On Chinese attitudes 
in dealing with foreigners, see Sebes, 114. Also useful are Carl Bickford 
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The Chinese would be negotiating from strength, but they wanted a 
settlement badly so they deal could with Mongol tribes. The Russians 
too needed peace in Siberia since they had to face the Ottomans, the 
Poles and the Swedes in the West, and their treasury was depleted. 
Both China and Russia hoped that peace would foster trade between 
Russian and China. Both were at the limits of their reach along the 
Amur River. These economic, geographic and strategic factors were 
more important than the Jesuit contribution to the final peace. 
The Chinese delegation arrived first on July 20 at Nerchinsk and 
included some fifteen thousand men, mainly troops. The Russian gar-
rison at N erchinsk numbered a mere five hundred men. On August 
9, the Russian chief negotiator, Fyodor Golovin, arrived with fifteen 
hundred troops and the Polish translator Andrei Belbotskii, who was 
as fluent in Latin. The final treaty was concluded August 27, 1685. 
The lead Chinese negotiator was Prince Songgotu, commander of 
the Emperor's bodyguard and an old friend of the Beijing Jesuits. He 
was helped by Sabsu, the governor of northern Manchuria, who had 
commanded the Chinese army during both attacks on Albazin.21 1he 
negotiations were to be conducted in Latin; the official text of the 
treaty was in Latin, with a Chinese translation for the Chinese and 
a Russian translation for the Russians. The text was the work of two 
Beijing Jesuits, but they were far more than mere translators. They 
informed the Chinese delegation about the outside world and about 
European negotiating procedures. The two Jesuits were the French-
man Fran~ois Gerbillon and the Portuguese Thomas Pereira. Pereira 
had long been the Emperor's personal music teacher; Gerbillon later 
became his official geographer. As Pereira was departing, Kang Xi gave 
him his own gown and told Songgotu to treat the two Jesuits as the 
Emperor himself-no doubt a bit of hyperbole, but significant. He 
told the Jesuits, "I am treating you with the honor and distinction that 
I accord to my grandees, whom you shall accompany •.• :' The Jesuits 
O'Brien, Russia under Two Tsars, 1682-1689: The Regency of Sophia Alek-
seeva (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952), 105 ff. and Fred W. 
Bergholz, The Partition of the Steppes: the Struggle of the Russians, Manchus 
and the Zunghar Mongols for Empire in Central Asia, 1619-1758: A Study 
in Power Politics (New York: Peter Lang, 1994). 
21 Semyonov, 115-16. 
11 e The Jesuits as Peace Makers 171 
did not fit into any regular Chinese category of officials, but influence 
often escapes fixed categories. 22 
Jesuit influence in Beijing had grown since Matteo Ricci arrived 
there in 1601. The Jesuits quickly established themselves as the em~ 
perors' main geographers and calendar makers. They served as the key 
conduit for western science, mathematics, geography, philosophy, art 
and religion to the Chinese, and of Chinese culture to the West. The 
Jesuit hope of finding a Chinese Constantine failed. Still, the favor the 
Jesuits enjoyed at court secured a measure of toleration for Christian 
missionary work anywhere in China. 
There are three main accounts of the Nerchinsk negotiations. Both 
Jesuits wrote diaries of them. There is also Golovin's official report to 
Peter the Great. Because Emperor Kang Xi did not want his negoti~ 
ating with Western barbarians as equals to set a precedent, it seems 
there were no comparable Chinese accounts. 
The Jesuits' motives for participating in the negotiations were mixed. 
Ending the Russian~Chinese hostilities was important, but Nerchinsk 
also offered an opportunity to earn the Emperor's favor. This the Jesu~ 
its achieved. Three years later, Kang Xi issued a decree which permit~ 
ted any Chinese to become Christian.23 
The Jesuits also tried to win the favor of the Russians. The Jesu~ 
its needed a new route to China through Russia and Siberia. Since 
Matteo Ricci's days, the Jesuits had come east under the patronage of 
the Portuguese crown, but the Portuguese empire in the Orient was 
crumbling under Dutch assaults. Increasingly the Italian, Portuguese 
and Spanish Jesuits in China were being replaced by French Jesuits. 
Louis XIV did not want Frenchmen to be subject to the Portuguese 
patronage and urged finding a new route.24 French~ Portuguese rivalry 
among the Jesuits in China, represented at Nerchinsk by Gerbillon 
and Pereira, does not seem to have hurt their work. 
The Portuguese route was long, dangerous and unhealthy. Of the 
six hundred Jesuits sent to China before the Treaty ofNerchinsk, only 
one hundred arrived. 'f\11 the rest;' we are told,"had been destroyed by 
shipwreck, illness, murder, or capture by pirates or other robbers:' 25 
22 Sebes, 110, 119. 
23 Semyonov,122; Sebes, 78,109. In 1717 Kang Xi cancelled the decree in 
the aftermath of the Chinese Rites controversy. 
24 Sebes, 87, 88. 
25 Sebes, 96. Semyonov, 114. 
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Both sides at Nerchinsk wanted peace, but a final agreement did 
not come easily. Hard bargaining was required to make them accept 
compromises. Here the Jesuits were the necessary catalyst. At the first 
session the Chinese demanded that the Russians surrender all the 
land between Lake Baikal and the Pacific-an area equivalent to the 
land from Boston to Denver. The Russians refused, and the Chinese 
dropped that opening ploy the next day. Pereira worked hard to get 
the Chinese to accept the Russians as equals, not barbarians. 26 As the 
negotiations continued, the Chinese turned more to the Jesuits for ad~ 
vice, rather to the annoyance of the Russians, who felt that they might 
otherwise have gained an advantage. It is impossible to trace all the 
rough spots in the negotiations. Some items from the section headings 
in Pereira's diary include: 
Second meeting ends in an impasse. 
Chinese distrust so great that war is imminent. 
Russians refuse Chinese demand that Albazin be the border. 
Russian intransigence, Chinese counter measures. 
Most of Chinese give up hope. 
Russians ask for new meeting but delay making proposals. 
Russians ask for Jesuits to go to their camp-Chinese allow only 
Gerbillon to go. 
Belbotskii brings new proposals for protocols in future negotia~ 
tions. 
Difficulties over having the Noz mountain as a border. 
Russians send protest letter to Chinese. 
Jesuits visit Russian camp to urge concessions. 
New Russian proposals, Chinese counter proposals. 
Jesuits urge Russians to come to a decision; urge Chinese to be pa~ 
tient. 
Celebration following the signing of the treaty. 27 
Clearly, without the Jesuit brokers, the Nerchinsk negotiations would 
probably have been aborted. Two recent scholars have said that the 
treaty "may be considered one of the most successful ever made, in~ 
26 Sebes, 108. 
27 Sebes, 172~ 73. I have rephrased, shortened and dropped many of these 
entries for the sake of brevity. 
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augurating a period of peace which lasted for one hundred seventy 
years:' 28 
SITTING BULL AND FATHER PIERRE-JEAN DE 2 9 
For our last Jesuit peacemaker, we must leap almost two hundred years 
forward and across the Pacific to the mid~western United States. By 
1867, the Civil War was over. But what of the Indians? In 1867 Con~ 
gress set up a Peace Commission, which has been termed "a reasonable 
mixture of military firmness and humanitarian leniency:' 30 The Com~ 
mission, admitting that past wars were mainly due to the white man, 
said, "But it is said our wars with them have been nearly constant. 
Have we been uniformly unjust? We answer unhesitatingly, yes:'31 The 
Commission had a new "hitherto untried policy •.. to conquer by kind~ 
ness" 32-to settle the Indians on reservations which would be off~ lim~ 
its to all white men except Indian agents and missionaries, give them 
personal possession of plots, if they wanted them, up to three hundred 
twenty acres for a family, farming implements, seed, and training for 
the men in how to farm, for the women in how to make clothes. The 
army pulled back and burned its forts. Both humanitarians and the 
military were convinced that the treaties were the Indians' last chance 
to survive. 33 
28 Lantzeff, 181. 
29 For this part of the paper I have used the following sources: Robert M. 
Utley, The Lance and the Shield: The Life and Times of Sitting Bull (New 
York: Henry Holt, 1993); Stanley Vestal, Sitting Bull: Champion of the 
Sioux, A Biography (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press 1932/ reprint 
1956); H.M. Chittenden and A. T. Richardson, The Life, Letters and Trav~ 
els of Father Pierre]ean DeSmet, 1801-1878 (New York: Francis P. Harper, 
1905) Vol. Ill; John J. Killoren, "Come Blackrobe" (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press,1993);John Upton Terrell, Black Robe: The Life of Pierre-
Jean DeSmet, Missionary, Explorer & Pioneer (Garden City, N.Y.: Double~ 
day, 1964); Gilbert J. Garraghan, The Jesuits of the Middle United States 
(New York: America Press, 1938) Vol. III; Francis Paul Prucha, The Great 
Father: The United States Government and the American Indians (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1989) 2 vols. 
30 Prucha, I, 490. 
31 Ibid I, 491. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Killoren, 315 
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But how to convince the tribes to sign the treaties? Secretary of 
the Interior, H. 0. Browning, appointed as "envoy extraordinary" the 
famous Belgian Jesuit, Pierre~ Jean De Smet to this task. The native 
Americans esteemed De Smet the Black Robe more than any other 
white man. General William Harney, a member of the Peace Commis~ 
sion, claimed that De Smet "has almost unbounded influence over the 
Indians:'34 Starting in 1844, De Smet had made five major journeys 
among the tribes securing peace. Late in 1867, he traveled from St. 
Louis to Fort Buford near the borders of North Dakota, Montana, 
and Canada. He sat in council with tribe after tribe, an estimated fif~ 
teen thousand Indians, and urged them to accept the treaties. Later 
that year, the land being offered the Indians was reduced to less than 
half his own recommendations. 35 He returned to St. Louis to prepare 
for a second trip but his health collapsed-he was 68. 
By April1868 his health had been sufficiently restored for him to 
join five generals, including William T. Sherman and Phil Sheridan, in 
a special train across Nebraska. Enroute they held a successful meet~ 
ing with leaders of the Brllles tribe. 36 Sherman promised adequate 
hunting grounds and protection from white intruders and distributed 
presents to the Indians. 
But what of the hostile Hunkpapa Sioux who were hiding some~ 
where in the upper reaches of the Missouri and Yellowstone Rivers? 
Sherman proposed that DeSmet go and find them. DeSmet's boat 
trip up the Missouri took thirty~three days and included many stops 
to discuss the treaty with tribes along the way. Many chiefs warned him 
against going to the Sioux, saying that it would cost him his scalp. But 
when he insisted on going forward, eighty Indians from seven tribes 
accompanied De Smet, his old friend and interpreter, C.E. Galpin, 
and Galpin's famous Sioux wife, Eagle Woman. De Smet had warned 
Galpin, "I know the danger of such a trip. I have no other motives than 
the welfare of the Indians and will trust to the kind providence of 
God:'37 
The expedition set out on June 3, 1868. Thirteen days later their 
scouts made contact with eighteen Hunkpapa Sioux. The next day as 
the Sioux and De Smet advanced down the Powder River valley, sud~ 
34 Terrell, 348; Utley, 77; for Harney's quote: Killoren, 310. 
35 Terrell, 349~56; Killoren, 309. 
36 Killoren, 313~16. 
37 Chittenden, 896. 
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denly five hundred warriors came racing toward them. DeSmet un, 
furled a banner of the Blessed Virgin he had carried for the occasion. 
The Sioux were intrigued by the strange flag and came up to shake 
De Smet's hand and led him into Sitting Bull's vast camp of some five 
thousand warriors. 38 
De Smet exhausted, asked for food, then fell asleep. When he awoke 
he was face to face with Sitting Bull and three other chiefs. Just days 
earlier, Sitting Bull had led raids near Forts Buford and Stevenson 
which killed two white men and captured two mail riders of mixed 
blood. Sitting Bull stripped the riders and sent them back to the army 
with the message that he and his chiefs would not meet with the Peace 
Commissioners and would go on killing white men till they all cleared 
out of Indian country.39 Sitting Bull now addressed DeSmet: ~~Black, 
robe, I hardly sustain myself beneath the weight of white man's blood 
that I have shed. The whites provoked the war" with a massacre of 
some seven hundred ~~women, children and old men .... I rose, toma, 
hawk in hand, and I have done all the hurt to the whites that I could. 
Today thou art amongst us and ... I will listen to thy good words, and 
bad as I have been to the whites, just so good am I ready to become 
toward them:' 4<l Sitting Bull promised to convene a Great Council. 
The Great Council met on June 21, 1868 and drew some five thou, 
sand Indians. After passing the peace pipe with leading chiefs, De 
Smet spoke and urged the Indians to renounce war and embrace the 
Great Father's offer of land, farming implements, domestic animals 
and training. Otherwise the sheer power of the white man and his 
armies and the dying off of the buffalo and other game meant inevi, 
table death. The four chiefs spoke and agreed. De Smet wrote a sum, 
mary of Black Moon's speech, who concluded,~~We have been forced to 
hate the whitesj let them treat us like brothers and the war will cease. 
Let them stay home; we will never go to trouble them .... Let us throw 
a veil over the past, and let it be forgotten:'41 
De Smet left the Indian camp and traveled three hundred fifty miles 
to Fort Rice, where, together with three generals and the representa, 
rives of some fifty thousand Indians, he signed the peace treaty on 
July 2. Eight speakers from among the twenty tribes represented paid 
38 Terrell, 369,70; Chittenden, 909,11; Killoren, 319. 
39 Utley, 78; Chittenden, 912. 
40 Chittenden, 912; Terrell, 371. 
41 Chittenden 916,17; Killoren 320,21; Terrell372,74. 
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special tribute to DeSmet and his work. The next day the generals 
wrote De Smet: "You will find your true reward for your labors and for 
the dangers and privations you have encountered in the consciousness 
that you have done much to promote peace on earth and good will to 
men:'42 On July 4, the army distributed presents and De Smet left for 
St. Louis University. When he got home, he was so sick that the doc~ 
tors despaired of his life. Again he recovered and lived until1873.43 
The peace did not last so long. 
The sequel to this story is well known. In August 1868, roving bands 
of Indians raided and killed in Kansas and Colorado. On November 
27, Lieutenant Colonel George Custer's men raided a sleeping village 
of Cheyennes and killed more than one hundred Indians. Eight years 
later, Sitting Bull avenged that at the Little Big Horn. In 1871, Con~ 
gress gave up making treaties with native American groups as if they 
were foreign nations. 44 De Smet was therefore the least successful of 
our Jesuit peacemakers, but through no fault of his own. 
CONCLUSIONS: JESUITS AS PEACEMAKERS 
Let us try to draw some tentative generalizations from these three test 
cases of Jesuits as peacemakers. In no case did they cause the peace; 
rather the warring nations saw peace as more desirable than war for 
military, economic, and political reasons. But this realization is often 
not enough to secure peace. In earlier times, the ego of monarchs and, 
in modem times the rage of nationalism have kept nations fighting 
to the point of either total defeat or total victory. Would not all the 
nations of Europe have profited if they had embraced Benedict XV's 
peace proposals in 1917? Yet, the slaughter continued until empires 
crumbled. 
In all three of our cases, the Jesuits acted as catalysts. They were 
able to play this role because they enjoyed a degree of trust from both 
sides. Why trust? Ironically, because they were outsiders, persons who 
had little to gain from victory and much to gain from peace. Possevino 
was an Italian mediating between Poles and Russians. Gerbillon and 
Pereira were western Europeans in a dispute between Chinese and 
Russians. De Smet was a Belgian-Sitting Bull and the Sioux may 
4 2 Chittenden, 922. 
43 Chittenden, 919,21; Terrell, 375; Killoren, 322,27. 
44 Prucha, II 495,96; Killoren, 297,329. 
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not have known this, but he did not fit their usual categories for white 
men. He was a Black Robe, a special category, certainly neither army 
nor government agent nor settler, rather a man who had long enjoyed 
charismatic relations with Indians. Peace is built on trust, and the In~ 
dians trusted De Smet when he told them that their only alternative 
to the hated reservation was extermination, for they knew he had their 
interests at heart. 
At Jam Zapolski, the Russians knew that Possevino preferred the 
Poles, yet they could trust his basic neutrality because he in principle 
wanted peace and because his other goals-the alliance against the 
Turks, opening Russia to Catholicism and eventual church reunion-
could not grow out of a treaty which hurt Moscovia. Likewise at 
Nerchinsk, the Jesuits were in the employ of the Chinese emperor, 
but the Russians knew that the Jesuits wanted that alternative route 
to China across Siberia, and for that they needed peace and Russian 
benevolence. 
What did the Jesuits as such gain from their peace making~ Pos~ 
sevino's work gained nothing from Ivan but it did increase Bathory's 
favor toward the Jesuits. Nerchinsk was followed by a short~lived edict 
of toleration in China. De Smet's work was undone within months. 
These three Jesuit peace efforts have generally been praised by histori~ 
ans-for all that's worth-but not always: several nineteenth century 
Russian historians blamed the Jesuits for the loss of the Amur River 
Valley and, ironically, a Soviet historian praised them. 45 What did the 
Jesuits really gain~ Christ's commendation: "Blessed are the peacemak~ 
, 
ers. 
45 Stephan, 32, Sebes, 77; Semyonov, 118, 122. 
